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Abstract. The Secure Shell Protocol (SSH) is a well-known standard protocol 
for remote login and used as well for other secure network services over an in-
secure network. It is mainly used for remotely accessing shell accounts on 
Unix-liked operating systems to perform administrative tasks. For this reason, 
the SSH service has been for years an attractive target for attackers, aiming to 
guess root passwords performing dictionary attacks, or to directly exploit the 
service itself. To test the classification performance of different classifiers and 
combinations of them, this study gathers and analyze SSH data coming from a 
honeynet and then it is analysed by means of a wide range of classifiers. The 
high-rate classification results lead to positive conclusions about the identifica-
tion of malicious SSH connections. 
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1 Introduction 
A network attack or intrusion will inevitably violate one of the three computer securi-
ty principles -availability, integrity and confidentiality- by exploiting certain vulnera-
bilities such as Denial of Service, Modification and Destruction [1]. One of the most 
harmful issues of attacks and intrusions, which increases the difficulty of protecting 
computer systems, is precisely the ever-changing nature of attack technologies and 
strategies. 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) [2-4] have become an essential asset in addi-
tion to the computer security infrastructure of most organizations. In the context of 
computer networks, an IDS can roughly be defined as a tool designed to detect suspi-
cious patterns that may be related to a network or system attack. Intrusion Detection 
(ID) is therefore a field that focuses on the identification of attempted or ongoing 
attacks on a computer system (Host IDS - HIDS) or network (Network IDS - NIDS). 
ID has been approached from several different points of view up to now; many dif-
ferent Computational Intelligence techniques - such as Genetic Programming [5], 
Data Mining [6-8], Expert Systems [9], Fuzzy Logic [10], or Neural Networks [11-
13] among others - together with statistical [14] and signature verification [15] tech-
niques have been applied mainly to perform a 2-class classification (nor-
mal/anomalous or intrusive/non-intrusive). 
The Secure Shell Protocol (SSH) is a standard protocol for remote login and used 
as well for other secure network services over an insecure network. It is an Applica-
tion Layer protocol under the TCP/IP stack. The SSH protocol consists of three major 
components: The Transport Layer Protocol that provides server authentication, confi-
dentiality, and integrity with perfect forward secrecy. The User Authentication Proto-
col which authenticates the client to the server. And the Connection Protocol that 
multiplexes the encrypted tunnel into several logical channels.   
The main usage of SSH protocol is for remotely accessing shell accounts on Unix-
liked operating systems with administrative purposes. For this reason, the SSH service 
has been for years an attractive service for attackers, aiming to guess root passwords 
performing dictionary attacks, or to directly exploit the service itself. The SANS Insti-
tute’s Internet Storm Center [16] keeps monitoring an average of 100,000 targets be-
ing attacked every day in Internet. Being able of distinguishing among malicious SSH 
packets and benign SSH traffic for server administration may play an indispensable 
role in defending system administrators against malicious adversaries.  
The aim of the present study is to assess classifiers and ensembles in the useful 
task of identifying bad-intentioned SSH connections. To do so, real data, coming from 
the Euskalert honeynet is analysed as described in the remaining sections of the paper. 
In this contribution, section 2 presents the proposed models that are applied to SSH 
data as described in section 3, together wit the obtained results. Some conclusions and 
lines of future work are introduced in section 4. 
1.1 SSH and Honeynets 
A honeypot has no authorised function or productive value within the corporate net-
work other than to be explored, attacked or compromised [17]. Thus, a honeypot 
should not receive any traffic at all. Any connection attempt with a honeypot is then 
an attack or attempt to compromise the device or services that it is offering- is by 
default illegitimate traffic. From the security point of view, there is a great deal of 
information that may be learnt from a honeypot about a hacker’s tools and methods in 
order to improve the protection of information systems.  
In a honeynet, all the traffic received by the sensors is suspicious by default. Thus 
every packet should be considered as an attack or at least as a piece of a multi-step 
attack. Numerous studies propose the use of honeypots to detect automatic large scale 
attacks; honeyd [18] and nepenthes [19] among others. The first Internet traffic moni-
tors known as Network Telescopes, Black Holes or Internet Sinks were presented by 
Moore et al. [20]. 
The Euskalert honeynet [21] has been monitoring attacks against well-known ser-
vices, including SSH. Furthermore, the sensors have recorded the SSH sessions used 
to administer and maintain the different devices of the infrastructure.   
Having both malicious and real administrative SSH traffic recorded, we perform a 
classification of such traffic to detect attacks against the SSH service.  
1.2 Previous Work 
Attacks to SSH service have attracted researchers’ attention for a long time. Song et 
al. [22] analysed timing and keystroke attacks. Researchers have also used honeypots 
to study and analyse attacks to this protocol, focusing on login attempts and diction-
ary attacks [23], [24]. In [24] authors analyse SSH attacks on honeypots focusing on 
visualisation of the data gathered. The honeypots collect real attacks, making experi-
ments and analysis results applicable to real deployments. 
Considering the data capture, as previously introduced, the present study takes ad-
vantage of the Euskalert project [21]. It has deployed a network of honeypots in the 
Basque Country (northern Spain) where eight companies and institutions have in-
stalled one of the project’s sensors behind the firewalls of their corporate networks. 
The honeypot sensor transmits all the traffic received to a database via a secure com-
munication channel. These partners can consult information relative to their sensor 
(after a login process) as well as general statistics in the project’s website. Once the 
system is fully established, the information available can be used to analyse attacks 
suffered by the honeynet at network and application level. Euskalert is a distributed 
honeypot network based on a Honeynet GenIII architecture [25].  
2 Proposal 
One of the most interesting features of IDSs would be their capability to automatically 
detect whether a portion of the traffic circulating the network is an attack or normal 
traffic. This task is more challenging when confronting brand-new bad intentioned 
activities with no previous examples. Automated learning models (classifiers) [26] are 
well-known algorithms designed specifically for the purpose of deciding about previ-
ously-unseen data. This issue makes them suitable for the IDS task. Going one step 
further, ensemble methods [27] combine multiple algorithms into one usually more 
accurate than the best of its components. So, the main idea behind ensemble learning 
is taking advantage of classification algorithms diversity to face more complex data. 
For this reason, present study proposes the combination of classifiers to get more 
accurate results when detecting anomalous and intrusive events. 
A wide variety of automated learning techniques have been applied in this study to 
classify SSH connections. Several base classifiers as well as different ways of com-
bining them have been considered for the analysis of Euskalert data. 35 base classifi-
ers have been applied in present study, comprising neural models such as the Multi-
Layer Perceptron and Voted-Perceptron [28], decision trees such as CART [31] or 
REP-Tree [32], and traditional clustering algorithms such as the k-Nearest Neigh-
bours (K-NN) [30]. 
These base classifiers have been combined according to the ensemble paradigm by 
19 different strategies. The applied ensemble schemes range from basic ones such as 
Bagging [33] or boosting-based [34] (Adaboost) to some other, more modern algo-
rithms such as the LogitBoost [35] or the  StackingC [36]. As results prove, ensemble 
learning adds an important value to the analysis, as almost all variants consistently 
improve results obtained by the single classifier. 
3 Experimental Validation on Real Data 
As previously mentioned, the performance of automated learning techniques have 
been assessed using real datasets, coming from the Euskalert project. The detailed 
information about the data and the run experiments is provided in this section.  
3.1 Datasets 
We have performed the experimental study by extracting SSH data related to 34 
months of real attacks and administration tasks that reached the 8 sensors of the 
Euskalert project [25]. Data from a so long time period guarantees that a broad variety 
of situations are considered. 
This honeynet system receives 4,000 packets a month on average. The complete 
dataset contains a total of 2,647,074 packets, including TCP, UDP and ICMP traffic 
received by the distributed honeypot sensors. For this experiment, we have analysed 
SSH connections happened between May 2008 and March 2011. First, we have fil-
tered out traffic containing real attacks to the SSH port (22), and SSH connections to 
the system management port (2399). 
Then, the traffic has been processed in order to obtain the Secure Shell sessions out 
of the packets. Two different approaches have been used in order to identify the ses-
sions: 
The approach for defining an SSH session was based on the TCP logic, using 
packets with the same source IP, same destination IP and a common source port. This 
last value is a non-privileged port number that remains the same during any TCP ses-
sion. Out of the 2,647,074 packets, the TCP-based dataset was summarized as 8,478 
attack sessions and 82 administration sections. 
The features that were extracted from each one of the sessions in the dataset are 
described in table 1. 
Table 1. Features for SSH sessions. 
Feature Description 
Src IP address of the source host 
Time duration of the session 
Numpac number of packets that the source host sent 
Minlen minimum size of the packets 
Maxlen maximum size of the packets 
Avglen average size of the packets 
Numflags amount of different flags used 
 
Table 2 shows the range of each feature, depending on the nature of the session 
(administrator or attack). 
Table 2. Range of features for SSH sessions. 
Feature Type Attack Administrator 
Src inet --- --- 
Time interval 00:00:00 – 352 days 
09:48:19.891 
00:00:00.004 – 519 
days 18:24:05.446 
Numpac integer 1 - 95 1 - 23 
Minlen integer 40 - 64 40 - 380 
Maxlen integer 40 - 220 40 - 380 
Avglen numeric(8,2) 40 - 96 40 - 380 
Numflags integer 1 - 6 1 - 4 
3.2 Practical Settings 
The experimentation has been based on the performance of 1,534 tests, carried out 
through 35 different classifiers (such as "NaiveBayes", "Ibk", "LinearRegression", 
"JRip", "RBFNetwork", "SMO", etc.) combined by means of the following ensem-
bles: Base classifier, Bagging, Adaboost, MultiBoostAB, RandomSubSpace, Dag-
ging, Decorate, MultiClassClassifier, CVParameterSelection, AttributeSelectedClassi-
fier, ThresholdSelector, Vote, FilteredClassifier, Grading, MultiScheme, Ordi-
nalClassClassifier, RotationForest, Stacking, and StackingC. 
For testing purposes, each ensemble processes a combination of 10 same type base 
classifiers. The data sets were trained and classified with ensembles and classifiers by 
means of WEKA software [37]. 
3.3 Results 
To summarize the results data, only the classification rate from the base classifier and 
the highest rate from the different ensembles are shown below in Table 3 (comprising 
training results) and Table 4 (comprising classification results). 
Table 3. Training results on SSH sessions. 
# Classifier Base Classifier Max 
1 MultilayerPerceptron 0,99325 0,998053 
2 Naive Bayes 0,992861 0,99325 
3 K-nn IBK 0,997793 0,997923 
4 Decision tree SImpleCart 0,993899 0,998053 
5 Rule Induction Jrip 0,995846 0,998183 
6 RBF network 0,994159 0,996495 
7 REPTree 0,995717 0,997274 
8 NaiveBayesMultinomial 0,870457 0,990395 
9 IB1 0,997923 0,997923 
10 PART  0,996885 0,997923 
11 ZeroR 0,990395 0,990395 
12 BayesianLogisticRegression  0,990395 0,991044 
13 ComplementNaiveBayes    0,754154 0,990395 
14 DMNBtext  0,990395 0,990395 
15 NaiveBayesMultinomialUpdateable  0,872144 0,990395 
16 NaiveBayesUpdateable 0,992861 0,99325 
17 Logistic     0,992082 0,997534 
18 SMO        0,990524 0,998183 
19 SPegasos   0,990395 0,990395 
20 VotedPerceptron     0,990395 0,997664 
21 DTNB 0,997534 0,998053 
22 DecisionTable 0,998053 0,998183 
23 NNge 0,995976 0,997274 
24 OneR 0,997534 0,997793 
25 Ridor 0,996625 0,997534 
26 ADTree 0,996366 0,998183 
27 BFTree 0,99338 0,998183 
28 DecisionStump 0,99351 0,995457 
29 FT 0,994548 0,997793 
30 J48 0,995846 0,998183 
31 LADTree 0,995846 0,997923 
32 LMT 0,995067 0,997923 
33 NBTree 0,994029 0,997923 
34 RandomForest 0,996885 0,997793 
35 RandomTree 0,996495 0,997404 
 
Table 4. Classification results on SSH sessions. 
# Classifier Base Classifier Max 
1 MultilayerPerceptron 0,992982 0,997661 
2 Naive Bayes 0,992982 0,992982 
3 K-nn IBK 0,996491 0,997661 
4 Decision tree SImpleCart 0,994152 0,997661 
5 Rule Induction Jrip 0,995322 0,997661 
6 RBF network 0,992982 0,996491 
7 REPTree 0,994152 0,997661 
8 NaiveBayesMultinomial 0,854971 0,990643 
9 IB1 0,996491 0,997661 
10 PART  0,997661 0,99883 
11 ZeroR 0,990643 0,990643 
12 BayesianLogisticRegression  0,990643 0,991813 
13 ComplementNaiveBayes    0,753216 0,990643 
14 DMNBtext  0,990643 0,990643 
15 NaiveBayesMultinomialUpdateable  0,85614 0,990643 
16 NaiveBayesUpdateable 0,992982 0,992982 
17 Logistic     0,991813 0,997661 
18 SMO        0,990643 0,997661 
19 SPegasos   0,990643 0,997661 
20 VotedPerceptron     0,990643 0,997661 
21 DTNB 0,997661 0,997661 
22 DecisionTable 0,997661 1 
23 NNge 0,996491 0,997661 
24 OneR 0,997661 0,99883 
25 Ridor 0,997661 0,997661 
26 ADTree 0,995322 0,997661 
27 BFTree 0,994152 0,997661 
28 DecisionStump 0,992982 0,995322 
29 FT 0,992982 0,997661 
30 J48 0,995322 0,99883 
31 LADTree 0,994152 0,997661 
32 LMT 0,991813 0,997661 
33 NBTree 0,992982 0,997661 
34 RandomForest 0,997661 0,997661 
35 RandomTree 0,997661 0,99883 
 
From Table 4, it can be seen that the best classification result (1) is obtained by the 
DecisionTable classifier combined by the Adaboost ensemble. 
4 Conclusions and Future Work 
Classification of benign and malicious SSH sessions is extremely valuable for pre-
venting unauthorized users to access production networks. The successful classifica-
tion results obtained in this study can efficiently discover a malicious connection 
attempt and make possible to discard the session before a dictionary attack becomes a 
major problem to the network assets. 
It has been shown how base classifiers provide good results in differentiating real 
administering SSH sessions from attacks, but the use of ensemble classifiers even 
improve the effectiveness up to a 100% in at least one case. 
This may be due to the fact that a real SSH session can be comprised by an increas-
ing number of different bash commands, generated by few different IP addresses 
(administrators). This would derive in a more specific behaviour than the rest of SSH 
attacks gathered by the honeynet. 
Those exceptional classification results obtained by ensemble classifiers can be ap-
plied to other protocols and services of the attacks received by the honeynets, such as 
HTTP, SNMTP, or even FTP, learning from the honeypots classification models that  
will later prevent detected attacks surpass the organization networks causing any 
damage. 
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